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Summary
The 2008-2009 global crisis created major 
challenges for fiscal policy, monetary pol-
icy and the financial regulatory author-
ity at the same time. To respond to these 
challenges, proactive and innovative so-
lutions were needed. This paper presents 
the niche volume of the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank (National Bank of Hungary), which 
describes the measures that resulted in 
the turnaround of the Hungarian fiscal 
and monetary policy.
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The US subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 
and other factors like significant interna-
tional trade imbalances, high debt levels 
in several major economies, real estate 
bubbles, and lax regulation of non-de-
pository financial institutions has caused 
the most serious financial crisis since the 
Great Depression. This crisis had a huge 
global impact as well. In 2009 the annual 
per capita real GDP of the world declined 
by almost 3%, resulting a global reces-
sion. This crisis was so significant that it 
has earned its own name, entering the 
economic history books as the Great Re-
cession. 
Because of the severe and global im-
pact of the crisis, governments and cen-
Géza Sebestyén, PhD, Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest 
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436
Academic Workshop and Book Reviews
tral banks had to take complex measures 
to fight the negative consequences, like 
the high unemployment rates, low or 
negative GDP growth, and struggling fi-
nancial systems. Although the crisis was 
having a global impact, some countries 
were facing more significant and com-
plex challenges. One of these countries 
were Hungary. 
Multiple factors caused the complex 
problems of the Hungarian economy. 
The country had a high government debt 
ratio (71.6% in 2008), mostly because of 
the huge budget deficits of the previous 
years (the negative balance was between 
6% and 10% of the GDP in the years 
2002-2006, much higher than the 3% 
Maastricht criteria). As one of the conse-
quences, the level of the public debt was 
expanding rapidly. External financing 
requirement was also high, and the coun-
try was dependent on foreign financing 
in times when international capital flows 
to emerging markets have dried out sig-
nificantly. The employment rate was one 
of the lowest in Europe (around 50% 
before the crisis). The composition of 
the household debt was also a significant 
problem, since majority of this debt (in 
2008 around 70%) was denominated in 
foreign currencies, mainly Swiss francs. 
Thus, as the Hungarian forint weakened 
because of the capital outflows triggered 
by crisis, the debt burden of the popu-
lation increased materially. Because of 
these problems, Hungarian policymakers 
were facing a more complex and chal-
lenging situation, than their European, 
American or Japanese colleagues. Both 
fiscal and monetary policy was in a des-
perate need of a sharp turnaround. 
This review is organised in three parts 
in line with the three main chapters of 
the book. The first part is introducing 
the effects of the crisis on foreign central 
banks. The second part is focusing on 
the Hungarian monetary policy turna-
round. The third part is introducing the 
challenges and reforms in the Hungarian 
regulatory policy. 
The effects of the global crisis 
on central bank policy
The decades before the 2008-2009 cri-
sis gave a false sense of stability to many 
economists.1 Stable growth, falling infla-
tion and interest rates diverted the atten-
tion from widening imbalances. Among 
these imbalances, balances of payments 
problems were prominent. Current ac-
count imbalances were on the research 
agenda well before the 2008-2009 cri-
sis. Although many theories have been 
worked out to explain this phenomenon 
(i.e. Bretton Woods II, dark matter, ex-
cessive global savings, demand for secure 
investments) (Krugman, 2007), only few 
authors believed that this could not be 
sustained in the long run. A common as-
sumption was that current accounts must 
be balanced in an adjustment that would 
mostly affect countries with the largest 
surpluses and shortages. Events follow-
ing the crisis surprised both optimists 
and skeptics of sustainable imbalances. 
Although imbalances moderated, the dy-
namics of the processes was not in line 
with the expectations of the skeptics ei-
ther. The main losers of the crisis were 
not necessarily those countries, which 
had high surpluses or deficits. The euro 
area for example had a more or less bal-
anced current account. On the other 
hand, the deficit and surplus positions of 
the regions were maintained. 
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The depth and the global spillovers 
of the crisis required novel and com-
plex measures both in monetary policy 
and regulation. The main objectives of 
the monetary policy had to be reconsid-
ered. It became clear that price stability 
alone was not enough to ensure the sta-
bility of the financial system (Kolozsi and 
Hoffmann, 2016). The role of macro-
prudential policy has appreciated (Ábel 
et al., 2014). Real-economy targets such 
as the reduction of unemployment and 
the promotion of economic growth have 
become more pronounced. Short-term 
interest rates, which were formerly the 
main tools of monetary policy, hit the 
zero lower bound. In countries like Swit-
zerland, Sweden, or Japan, central banks 
experimented with negative interest rates 
but were cautious about the uncertain 
consequences of negative rates on finan-
cial and macroeconomic developments 
(see Figure 1). This also meant that cen-
tral banks had essentially lost their num-
ber one and best known instrument in 
conducting monetary policy.
Figure 1: Key interest rates
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Asset purchases that bloated central 
bank balance sheets became the key tool 
of central bank policy. Monetary eas-
ing was achieved in many cases through 
open market operations. Both the Fed 
and the ECB had launched liquidity-pro-
viding, targeted lending, and large-scale 
asset purchase programmes,2 which ac-
tions significantly boosted their balance 
sheets.3 With respect to balance sheet to-
tals, the most drastic measures were ap-
plied by the Japanese central bank, which 
increased the central bank assets to GDP 
ratio from 30% to over 90% in a few years. 
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In the case of the ECB the same ratio has 
increased to almost 40% from the pre-
crisis 17%, while the Fed went from 7% 
to over 22%. 
At the same time, the role of central 
bank communication became more pro-
nounced (Csortos and Lehmann, 2014) 
as medium and long-term yields (which 
are of paramount importance for the eco-
nomic actors) were determined by the 
subsequent short yields of the full matu-
rity, hence monetary easing can not only 
be achieved by lowering the short-term 
yields, but also by lowering market expec-
tations regarding future short-term yields.4
The severity of the global downturn 
posed serious challenges to monetary 
policy makers. Interest rates at zero level 
did not enhanced growth, or solved in-
flation and unemployment problems, so 
additional tools were needed to address 
the crisis. These new, previously untested 
tools, combined with the once in a life-
time economic downturn created serious 
uncertainty among economic actors. Be-
sides, monetary transmission became less 
efficient and more difficult to forecast. 
In addition, many central banks faced 
unique, specific problems.5 
The first main chapter of the volume 
guides us through the international con-
sequences of the crisis. Starting with the 
build-up of global imbalances, introduc-
ing the pre-crisis explanations, guiding 
us through the unfolding of the crisis, 
and depicting the situation of the global 
economy after the crisis (decreasing flow 
but remaining stock imbalances, balance 
sheet recession, protracted recovery), 
the changing framework of the monetary 
policy (transmission mechanisms, the re-
lationship between fiscal and monetary 
policy, changing objectives, reform of the 
instruments) and the responses of the 
major central banks to the crisis (crisis 
management, unconventional monetary 
policy instruments and changing frame-
work and communication of the Fed, the 
ECB). In the last part of the first main 
chapter, we receive an overview of the 
protracted struggles of the BoJ against 
sub-target inflation. 
Complex economic and monetary 
policy related challenges 
in Hungary
The crisis hit Hungary in a particularly 
vulnerable state. The economic growth 
before 2006 was unsustainable, the high 
budget deficit (Orbán and Szapáry, 2006) 
(the country was subject to the excessive 
deficit procedure since 2004) has sig-
nificantly increased the total debt of the 
country. Both the public and the private 
sector has increased its indebtedness ma-
terially. The external financing require-
ment was high, which was boosted not 
only by the public overspending, but by 
the high volume foreign currency retail 
lending as well (Matolcsy and Palotai, 
2016, see Figure 2). The country was 
also running on a high current account 
deficit. And, though the reforms of 2006 
were able to bring the very high public 
deficit to lower levels, current account 
deficit remained high, so external imbal-
ances remained, and the cuts in public 
spending significantly dampened both 
the potential and the actual GDP growth 
rate of the country. These negative ten-
dencies were also amplified by the pro-
cyclical banking sector. 
Hence the effects of the global crisis 
were multiplied by some serious country-
specific problems, coming together to 
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Figure 2: Total debt to GDP in Hungary
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cause a severe recession. These negative 
processes had a significant and unfavour-
able impact on the domestic financial 
sector as well, which has propagated the 
adverse impacts pro-cyclically. Like the 
Baltic States, Hungary suffered the long-
est and largest decline in corporate lend-
ing in the region (Balog et al., 2014).
Hungary had faced problems regard-
ing both growth and stability even be-
fore the eruption of the crisis (Matolcsy, 
2016). In 2010 the newly elected gov-
ernment has implemented a deep fiscal 
turnaround, which has, in multiple steps, 
significantly improved the balance of the 
budget (Matolcsy and Palotai, 2014) by 
reducing work-related taxes, simplifying 
the system of taxes and contributions on 
labour, focusing on consumption and 
sales based, as well as sector-specific taxes, 
and introducing online cash registers.6 As 
a result of the fiscal turnaround, Hunga-
ry was released from the excessive deficit 
procedure in 2013 (Matolcsy, 2016).
Although the fiscal turnaround was 
very successful in reversing the tendencies 
and was able to stop fiscal dominance, the 
financial system still faced some serious 
challenges. To address these challenges, 
the new management of the National 
Bank of Hungary launched a complex 
monetary policy turnaround in 2013.
The monetary policy turnaround had 
multiple steps. The base rate was materially 
reduced in three easing cycles, from 7% to 
0.9%, by 610 basis points in total (see Fig-
ure 3). This has significantly reduced the 
interest burdens of both the public and 
the private sector. The National Bank of 
Hungary introduced its targeted lending 
incentive instruments, the Funding for 
Growth Scheme (FGS), and the Market-
Based Lending Scheme, which actions 
helped to kick-start the SME lending in the 
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country (Baksay and Palotai, 2017), which 
has been in decline since 2009 (Banai, 
2016). The National Bank of Hungary has 
developed and launched its Self-Financing 
Programme, a mix of actions with the ob-
jective of decreasing the external financing 
requirements of the country. This measure 
helped to cut the ratio of foreign currency 
debt to public debt from 50% in 2011 to 
25% in 2016 (Baksay and Palotai, 2017). 
The Central Bank was also a key player in 
the conversion of the substantial foreign 
currency denominated household debt to 
Hungarian forints. In the absence of this 
action, many people would have lost their 
homes and the country would have faced 
irreparable and significant social losses on 
15 January 2015, when the Swiss National 
Bank unpegged the CHF from the EUR. 
As majority of Hungarian private mort-
gages were denominated in Swiss francs, 
the massive strengthening of the Swiss cur-
rency would have materially increased the 
debt burden of the domestic debtors. 
Figure 3: Key interest rates in Hungary
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The second main chapter of the 
volume introduces the challenges and 
answers in Hungarian monetary policy. 
First we get familiar with the macroeco-
nomic conditions in the first decade of 
the 2000s, the path of the GDP growth 
rate from balanced to unsustainable to 
negative, the very high public deficit, tax 
wedge and social benefits, the increas-
ing public and private indebtedness and 
the external debt ratios. Then we can 
learn about the interactions between the 
fiscal turnaround and monetary policy, 
how the rearrangement of the tax re-
gime, the review of social expenditures, 
and the contracting budget deficit has 
helped and gave room to the monetary 
policy. The next chapter introduces the 
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way of Hungary from unsustainable in-
debtedness and a pro-cyclical banking 
system. After this we get familiar with the 
three easing cycles, which have resulted 
in a significant easing of the monetary 
conditions. The next chapter deals with 
the theoretical background of maintain-
ing the level of the base rate for an ex-
tended period of time. After this chap-
ter, we get an introduction into a more 
flexible framework of inflation targeting. 
Then we get to know the targeted lend-
ing instruments FGS and GSP (Growth 
Support Programme), which actions 
were helping not only domestic lending, 
but also growth in Hungary. The next 
chapter introduces the monetary policy 
considerations for the conversion of for-
eign currency loans. After this, we learn 
about the self-financing programme 
of the National Bank of Hungary. The 
next chapter deals with the develop-
ment of BUBOR and the domestic inter-
bank market. Then we get introduced 
to the logic behind the capping of the 
3-month deposit as unconventional eas-
ing. The next three chapters are guiding 
us through the instruments to improve 
the functioning of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism (a more efficient 
banking system, development and mod-
ernization of payments and financial 
infrastructures, and the relationships 
between monetary policy and the stock 
exchange). 
Changes in the Hungarian 
regulatory policy
In addition to monetary policy, Hungar-
ian regulatory policy had also significant-
ly changed and improved. The crisis has 
shown that monetary policy alone cannot 
ensure the long-term balance of an econ-
omy. The role of macroprudential policy 
has been appreciated both internation-
ally and domestically. The occasionally 
fatal impacts of the crisis on the banking 
sector and on some individual banks has 
led to the emergence of the resolution 
function. In addition, micro-prudential 
supervision, market surveillance and con-
sumer protection have been renewed. 
The third main chapter of the volume 
introduces these advancements. First 
we get introduced to the theoretical ba-
sis of macro-prudential policy, learning 
about the ultimate objective, the types of 
systemic risks and the market problems 
causing them, the instruments of macro-
prudential policy, and the institutional 
framework of macro-prudential policy. 
The next chapter is a detailed account of 
the targeted Hungarian macro-prudential 
policy instruments which were introduced 
and used after the crisis like the debt cap 
rules payment-to-income ratio and the 
loan-to-value ratio, the countercyclical 
capital buffer, the liquidity coverage re-
quirement, the foreign exchange funding 
adequacy ratio, the foreign exchange cov-
erage ratio, or the mortgage funding ade-
quacy ratio. After this we get introduced to 
the new resolution function of the Nation-
al Bank of Hungary, where we learn about 
the goals, the setup of the new function, 
resolution planning, the conditions for or-
dering resolution, tools and international 
activities, and we get guided through the 
resolution of MKB Bank, one of the larg-
est banks in Hungary. The next chapter 
offers an insight into the central bank su-
pervisory functions,7 where we can learn 
about the aim and the instruments of su-
pervision, like the capital requirement di-
rective, the bank resolution and recovery 
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directive, the market abuse directive, the 
markets in financial instruments directive, 
licensing and enforcement activities, the 
concept of continuous supervision, types 
of inspections, and the market surveil-
lance procedures. Next we get an overview 
of the improvements in the Hungarian 
micro-prudential supervision, like strong-
er supervisory regulation, the forward-
looking approach, the basic monitoring 
system and the early warning system, the 
business model analysis, targeted and pe-
riodical inspections, stronger sanctioning, 
the internal capital adequacy assessment 
process, the internal liquidity adequacy 
assessment process, the liquidity coverage 
ratio, stress testing, the admission of capi-
tal market products and the gatekeeper 
role of the central bank, the supervision 
of insurance companies and funds. After 
this, we are offered an in depth look into 
the market surveillance and consumer 
protection procedures, where we get ac-
quainted with the means of evidence, the 
inspection instruments, prevention, the 
priority of market surveillance, the para-
digm shift in consumer protection, and 
the right to prepare action in the public 
interest. The last chapter deals with the 
new approaches and challenges of regula-
tion in the 21st century, like cloud-based 
technologies, e-administration, the emer-
gence of new players, the alternative bank-
ing system, technological challenges, the 
impact of digitalization, and the develop-
ment of the efficiency of IT supervision 
and data analysis. 
The monograph is an equally useful 
source for both domestic and interna-
tional experts, academics and students, 
as well as for those of the general public, 
who are interested in the complex chal-
lenges ignited by the 2008-2009 global 
crisis as well as the countermeasures of 
the domestic monetary and regulatory 
decision-makers. The reader will not only 
get a professionally outstandingly precise 
and versatile introduction of the events, 
but also a colorful, readable account of 
the proactive and innovative measures of 
the National Bank of Hungary, with 46 
tables, 216 figures, numerous framed sto-
ries and small case studies. This work is 
a worthy continuation of the book series 
launched by the National Bank of Hun-
gary in 2015, with the first two volumes 
Balance and Growth (2015) and Competi-
tiveness and Growth (2016).
The editors of the monograph are 
Kristóf Lehmann, Head of the Monetary 
Strategy Department of the National 
Bank of Hungary and the MNB Depart-
ment at Corvinus University of Budapest, 
Dániel Palotai, Executive Director and 
Chief Economist of the National Bank of 
Hungary, and Barnabás Virág, Executive 
Director of the National Bank of Hun-
gary responsible for Monetary Policy and 
Credit Promotion.
(Lehmann, Kristóf; Palotai, Dániel and 
Virág, Barnabás (eds.) (2017): A magyar út 
– célzott jegybanki politika [The Hungarian 
way – targeted central banking policy]. Ma-
gyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest, 955 pages.)
Notes
1  The years between the mid-1980s and the late-
2000s were labelled as the Great Moderation. 
Many believed that because of central bank in-
dependence, improved modelling, better mon-
etary policy frameworks and tools, and an im-
proved economic structure, the world economy 
has entered into a more predictable and less 
volatile state. 
2  The Fed introduced the terms auction facility, 
securities lending facility, primary dealer credit 
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facility, the asset-backed commercial paper 
money market mutual fund liquidity facility, the 
commercial paper funding facility, the term asset-
backed securities loan facility, the large-scale asset 
purchase programmes, and the maturity exten-
sion programme. The ECB has started its main 
refinancing operations, long-term refinancing 
operations, targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations, FS swap tenders, the covered bond 
purchase programmes, the securities market pro-
gramme, the public sector purchase programme 
and the corporate sector purchase programme. 
3  These actions also significantly increased money 
supply, measured by M0. 
4  Two important practical examples are the for-
ward guidance, a tool extensively used by many 
central banks after the crisis, and the famous 
“whatever it takes” speech by ECB president 
Mario Draghi on the 26th of July 2012, which 
was able to calm down the markets, and contrib-
uted to a sharp turnaround in the evolution of 
the government bond yields of the PIGS coun-
tries. 
5  Greece and Japan was dealing with high levels of 
government debt and high public deficit, Russia 
was impacted by the falling oil prices, Switzer-
land saw a flood of capital inflow and hence a 
quickly appreciating currency, the US, Ireland 
and Spain saw their real estate prices collapsing, 
Latvia, Croatia and Hungary was suffering be-
cause the foreign currency loans of the private 
sector. 
6  The budget deficit, which moved between 4% 
and 10% before 2010 has decreased significantly, 
mildly fluctuating around 2% since 2012. 
7  The National Bank of Hungary has assumed the 
tasks related to the supervision of financial insti-
tutions and financial consumer protection from 
the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(PSZÁF) on the 1th of October 2013. 
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